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Is the Sheil a Shill? Informal
Credit in Rural Sudan

MICHAEL KEVANE

Then I saw them dividing up the sacks between them. Hussein the merchant took ten;

each of the strangers took five. Mousa the owner of the field next to ours on the eastern
side took five, and my grandfather took five. Understanding nothing, I looked at Masood

and saw that his eyes were darting about to left and right like two mice that have lost their

way home. "You're still fifty pounds in debt to me," said my grandfather to Masood,

"We'll talk about it later."
-Tayeb Salih, "A Handful of Dates," in The Wedding of Zein and Other Stories

My dictionary defines a shill as a person "who poses as an innocent bystander to help

a confidence man win over a prospective victim."' The Sudanese system of informal
credit, known as sheil2 credit, has been described by many academic writers as an

exploitative, usurious form of lending, much as Tayeb Salih implies about the loan
transaction between Masood and the grandfather. These writers argue that an important
cause ofthe persistence and deepening ofpoverty is the monopolistic position ofvillage
lenders. But is that really what the sheil is? Or has the sheil been misrepresented in order

to be consistent with a broader perspective about the nature of Sudanese rural society?
That is, might not the sheil be a shill for these writers, in the sense that it is posed, wrongly,

as a metaphor for the personalistic exploitation they see as pervading rural society.
Realizing this, we might hesitate to agree with the broad-brush characterizations that
have justified misguided and counterproductive policies.
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The purpose of this paper is not to be polemical, but to explore this possibility, in

hopes of influencing both the manner in which informal credit issues are researched
the way policymakers conceive of interventions in informal credit markets. Section

discusses the conventional wisdom on rural credit in Sudan. Section 2 summarizes som
theoretical and methodological problems with this conventional wisdom. Section 3

presents some "revisionist" evidence from both eastern and western Sudan. This
evidence, and the earlier discussion on the conventional wisdom, suggests some new
approaches to research on the topic, and these are explored in the fourth section. Section
5 presents concluding comments.
The Basis of the Conventional Wisdom

The subject of informal credit for peasant farmers in Sudan has achieved a certain

notoriety owing to the assumption that lending is problematic in a predominantly Islamic
country.3 It is widely held that merchants and would-be money lenders, in deference to
religious prohibitions against usury, developed a system of lending whereby standing
crops would be purchased early in the season. This supposedly highly exploitative

system is known as the sheil system. During the growing season, when the farmer is in
greatest need of cash and food, the merchant or lender enters into an agreement with the

farmer to buy a certain amount of the farmer's standing crop at a set price per sack. This
price will generally, though not with complete certainty, be lower than the price in the
market after the harvest. The lender pays the farmer at the time ofthe agreement and after
the harvest collects the sacks and stores them until prices are most favorable.
The conventional wisdom regarding the prevalence and nature of this system of

informal credit in Sudan is expressed in the following statements from A. B. Zahlan's
collection of papers on Sudanese agriculture:4
The majority of smallholders resort to traditional borrowing under the sheil system. The implied interest
rate differs according to location and time of borrowing but can be as high as 300 per cent for loans made

at the peak of the season (mid-August/early September).5
In the Gezira Scheme ... the rate of interest on informal loans ranged from 115 per cent to 280 per cent
despite the fact that a branch ofthe ABS [Agricultural Bank of Sudan] was present in the area and would offer
low interest loans and the built-in credit system of the Gezira board is available for cotton and wheat crops.6

Statements that moneylenders always charge high interest rates to offset the high risks they take lack
empirical data in support and many surveys in rural areas have contradicted this widely perpetuated myth.7

Surveys carried out by the ABS in this region [Kordofan] showed that 50 per cent of the cultivators
received sheil credit and realised only 50 per cent ofthe market price.... The system is as strongly entrenched
in this region as it is in other parts of Sudan.8

The local trade is controlled by village merchants and agents of big merchants and exporters. The sheil
credit system is one of the main reasons for village merchants getting large shares of the tenants' groundnut

sales.9

These selections are representative of the literature; almost every article or book on the
rural economy in Sudan focuses on the exploitative nature and pervasiveness ofthe sheil
system when discussing informal credit.

Only a handful of empirical studies, however, carefully investigate the extent and
volume ofthis practice. As far as the rainfed sector is concerned, only the extremely brief
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study by Handouk, Beshir, and Abudiek is explicitly concerned with credit.'0 The
authors interviewed 100 farmers in November 1984. They found that 34 percent
obtained credit for agricultural purposes from the sheil system. Of these, 88 percent
borrowed from village merchants while 12 percent borrowed from persons outside the
village. No information is given regarding the sizes of loans, repayments, or other
aspects of the system. A more general study by Awad found in a survey of 391
households in the Southern Kordofan region that only 11.8 percent of all households
obtained informal loans for agriculture, two-thirds of these in cash and the other third
in kind. Again, however, no information is given as to the amounts involved or the
methods of lending."
The more exhaustive works dealing with sheil analyze the system in the irrigated
schemes of eastern Sudan.'2 Adam and Apaya, in a study of 96 Gezira scheme tenants,
reported that well over 80 percent of those having between 5-20feddan (a feddan is
1.038 acres) obtained loans for dura (sorghum), around 45 percent for wheat, and over
35 percent for groundnuts.'3 For dura and groundnuts, these farmers usually obtained
loans equal in value to halformore oftheir crop. While not calculating interest rates, they
demonstrated the exploitative nature of the system by calculating the ratio of the price
received per sack by the borrower in a transaction and the price that prevailed in the
market after the harvest. In most cases the price was less than half the market price,
especially for the smaller tenants, who were generally the lower-income group. The
difference between the prices represents, of course, a clear and immediate profit to the
merchant. This is the major characteristic ofthe system that emerges from the literature;
the merchant always derives aprofit immediately upon repayment ofthe loanbyselling,
at the market price, the sacks received from the borrower. Adam and Apaya explained

how this system of direct and individual exploitation continued:
Little institutional credit is available to [the farmer] for production and marketing purposes and he is not

able to obtain consumer credit from institutional sources at all. Consequently, the tenant turns to village

merchants and other operators of traditional credit.... The terms on which he obtains credit from the
traditional system are not fair to him, but he continues to borrow from this source because alternative sources

are not available.14

El Medani, using data from 90 Gezira farmers interviewed throughout 1973-74,
found that almost two-thirds of all tenants borrowed money through the sheil system.'5

By analyzing the farmers' cash flows, El Medani determined the difference between
farmers' available funds and cash requirements during the growing season. This deficit

was mostly met by advances from the Sudan Gezira Board. El Medani noted:
Although the contribution of 'shail' is meagre in reducing the deficit, a good proportion of the farm

surplus is absorbed in repayment.... Nearly 70% (dura), 67% (wheat) and 34% (groundnuts) of the
remaining marketable surplus of the poor dealing in 'shail' is absorbed in repayment to these merchants.'6

According to El Medani, "the interest rate in the average period of the loan reached

80% or approximately 20% per month," and so the annual rates of interest ranged
between "300% and 7000% with a weighted average of 726%."'7 He did not present the
most important data needed for calculating the interest rate, namely, the amount paid to
the lender and the market price of dura at the time of repayment, so it is difficult to
interpret the interest rates reported.

More recently, Saleem has used data from a 1981 survey of six villages in the Gezira
and Rahad schemes to argue that the implicit interest rates of sheil loans are far higher
than those impliedby the "lender's risk" model.'8 Saleem found that when compounded

518 Michael Kevane

monthly, interest rates averaged between 172-201 percent on a per annum basis,
depending on the crop. Using the default rate reported by lenders, Saleem observed that
only around 12 percent of these interest payments could be accounted for as compensation for default risk. The rest, he argued, was due to monopoly rents.
The finding of these studies that small farmers in Sudan lose a considerable part of
their surplus because they have no option but to engage in exploitative lending
arrangements has been used to promote the expansion of government credit programs.
In the words of El Shibly:
These extremely high rates of profit to money-lenders signify the very poor connection between the
organized and the unorganized money markets in the Sudan. As a result, the resort to orthodox and

conventional monetary policy measures to bring down these rates does not seem likely to be fruitful....
However, this is not to say that the gradual abolition of the system is not attainable. Indeed, the volume of

official cheap loans can be increased through a wider dispersion of the Agricultural Bank and commercial
banks' branches.'9

Theoretical and Methodological Problems with Sheil Lending Research
There are a number of problems with the way sheil has been presented that suggest
a need for a more critical look. The studies reviewed earlier follow the conventional
"lender's risk" approach ofbreaking down the nominal interest rate into the various cost
components, with the residual being a measure ofmonopoly power. They use household
surveys to collect information on interest rates. Moneylenders and local commercial
banks are canvassed in order to determine the costs of lending. Included in the costs is
the rate of default. If the interest rate is found to be high relative to the costs of lending,

the market must be monopolistic and a rural credit program is needed. If the interest rate

is low, then the market is competitive and better left alone.
There are, I believe, six problems with this methodological approach and the theory
that underlies it.

First, since the lender rarely relies solely on lending as a source of income, it is
difficult to disentangle the costs of lending from costs incurred in other activities.

Second, it is not clear what the appropriate measure of opportunity cost should be,
especially in Sudan where activities are highly seasonal. Profits from rainy season
farming may be very different from dry season crop speculation.
Third, care must be taken in interpreting repayments as interest charges, since sheil
loans do not explicitly include interest charges. Sheil loans are similar to a forward
contract, or a crop mortgage. The borrower takes an amount of cash (A) and agrees to
repay a number of sacks (B) of produce, usually after harvest. The amount AIB is the
forward price at which the lender is purchasing produce. The return to the lender then
depends on the market price of the product (p) at the time the loan is repaid (assuming
the product is easily marketed). In this case the absolute profit is
pB-A,

and the return on capital (the implicit interest rate) over the period of the loan is
pB -A
A
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It is not appropriate to take this simple interest rate and turn it into an annual compound

rate (where interest is added to the principal) unless there is evidence that rates are, in
fact, compounded. Not compounding can make dramatic differences in reported interest
charges. For example, suppose the return on a sheil loan were calculated to be 60 percent
for a loan of three months. At a simple interest rate, this translates into 20 percent per
month, or 240 percent per year. If we assumed that the relevant interest rate was a
compound rate, that is 17 percent per month, which after three months yields 60 percent,

then the annual rate would be 558 percent. This is ridiculous of course, since in fact the
rates are not compounded.20

Fourth, the change in the price of the product from the time of repayment (usually
after harvest) until the postharvest peak price is irrelevant for calculating the return to
the lender from the loan. The lender could always have refused to make the loan and used

the money to purchase the crop after harvest and store it, thereby earning that return.
Similarly, the borrower could have refused to borrow, and then not have had to repay
the loan, and instead stored the crop until prices rose. So the postrepayment change in
crop price should not enter the calculation of the lender's return.
Fifth, it should be remembered that the preceding discussion deals with "after the
fact" returns on capital. The sheil contract has a risk-sharing component that is not
present in the ordinary interest rate contract. At the time of making the contract, those
involved do not know what the prices will be at harvest. Ifthe market price turns out high,
the merchant will make a large profit. If the price turns out low, however, the lender may

end up taking a loss. It is difficult to know how to measure the costs of this price risk.
One could attempt to measure the risk premium using a standard formula from utility
theory where the risk premium is equal to one-half the estimated coefficient of relative
risk aversion times the variance of income from loans. Another approach that some
researchers use is to look at historical rates of default, but this does not tell the researcher

how the lender values these uncertain losses.

Sixth, other indicators of the conditions under which loans are made-that is, their
structure (the number of actual and potential lenders and borrowers) and conduct (the

form of contracts, enforcement, and collateral)-are rarely examined to confirm or
negate the assessment that a monopolistic market structure exists.
Some "Revisionist" Evidence

In addition to the methodological problems of the work that forms the basis for
conventional wisdom about sheil, not all studies corroborate the view that informal
credit in Sudan is exploitative. A 1986 survey of El Obeid district found very little
informal credit, and of the loans that were reported, "no interest was charged on 89% of
the credit extended by informal sources.""2 Tully, in the context of an investigation into

the changing relations of exchange in Darfur, noted:
It [sheil] is not exceptional as a source ofprofit from the merchants point of view.... Those who extended

[groundlnuts on a two for one basis made less money than it seems, since nuts were worth LS 5.00 or more
at planting [versus 3.5-4.0 at harvest].22

Four studies undertaken by me-a survey in the Butana area along the Blue Nile in 1985
and three studies in the Sheikan area of Kordofan completed in 1990-also suggest that
the sheil may not be as monolithic an institution as the conventional wisdom suggests.
Let me review each in turn.
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Eastern Gezira. During the 1985 agricultural season that followed the drought and

famine of 1984, 1 conducted a survey of informal credit in an area of rainfed agricult

east of the Blue Nile across from the Gezira scheme and bordering the Rahad scheme

and the Butana pasturelands. The survey was designed to measure the extent, volume

types, and sources of borrowing.23 Four types of loans were distinguished: (1) loans o
dura (sorghum), where repayment was the cash value of the dura at the time of
borrowing, simply a buying on credit with no interest charge (these will be called dura-

LS loans, where LS stands for Sudanese pounds); (2) sheil loans, where the loan was
reckoned at the dura price prevailing after harvest, and where most respondents
indicated that no explicit price per sack was agreed on beforehand (LS-dura loans); (3)
no-interest cash loans with cash repayments (LS-LS loans); and (4) no-interest loans in
kind (dura-dura loans).
Tables 1 and 2 present the magnitude and number of these loans. The data has been
classified into two regions: the first is the area closer to the Blue Nile, where plots
cultivated are smaller, animal husbandry is less important, and work is available on small
irrigated farms along the river; and the second is the area along the Butana, where most
farmers have larger rainfed plots and often migrate to the irrigated schemes during the
off-season.

Given that the 1984 crop had failed almost completely in northern areas of Sudan, it
was not surprising to find that over 80 percent of all the families surveyed borrowed in
TABLE 1

EXTENT OF BORROWING AMONG SURVEY RESPONDENTS

(In Percentages)
Taking Taking More Taking More Taking More
Loans of than One than LS 200 than LS 400

Region Any Kind Loan in Value in Value
1

(N=

2

(N

Total

309)

82

28

35

11

=400)

80

35

50

30

(N=

NoTEs:

N

709)

=

81

32

number

44

22

of

responden

TABLE 2

VOLUME OF CASH AND DURA LOANS, TOTALS AND AVERAGES
CASH

DURA

Average
Total

Average

per

Total

Average

Average

per

REGION Loans Loan Borrower Loans Loan Borrower
LS-LSa

1

34,079

2

61,257

Total

122

200

95,336

Dura-LSb

154

226

163

193

LS-Duraa
1

3,805

2

30,786

Total

196

34,591

aIn Sudanese pounds.

bIn 100 kg sacks.

152

13.4

171.8

1.3

2.8

2.8

185.2

2.7

2.7

Dura-Durab

165

67.0

238

123.7

190

1.3

228

3.0

3.0

2.6

190.7

2.7

2.7

2.8
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some form or another, and 44 percent borrowed more than LS 200 in value, where loans
in kind were valued at the then current market price of LS 150 per hundred kilo sack of
dura. (At the time of the survey, the official exchange rate was LS 4 = US $1, so a loan

of LS 200 amounted to approximately $50.) Table 2 shows that the average loan size and
total amounts borrowed were higher in the less developed Butana region, where,

presumably, there was a higher demand for credit, as opposed to a higher supply.
Figure 1 gives the percentage distribution, by number of loans and by total value of
the loans, of the four different types of loans. The figure clearly shows that the LS-Dura
loans, those sheil-like agreements, constituted a very small proportion of the number of

loans (20 percent) and of the value of loans (19 percent). The notable feature of figure
1 is that most loans, i.e., the LS-LS loans, appear to have been extended with no
expectation of direct monetary gain for the lender. Indeed, some loans, like the dura-dura

loans, would lead to losses if the dura were valued at postharvest prices.
Those loans that did have an implicit interest component may be broken down

according to the source of the loan. The survey respondents were asked whether the loan
came from a merchant, a rich person living in the area, or another farmer. This very crude

80 -

Number of loans (Total = 908)

60 ~J Value of loans (Total = LS 186,312)
60

-

__

CD

CD
C"

a)

0 40-

20

0

LS - LS S - Dura Dura -LS Dura -Dura

Type of Loan

Fig. 1. Distribution of Types of Loans in Eastern Gezira Area by Numbe
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breakdown was intended to enable the borrowers to identify the defining characteri

of the lender; if the farmer sees the lender as a fellow farmer, rather than as a merchan

then the implicit interest rate would presumably reflect that social relationship. Ov

49 percent ofall loans came from merchants, and table 3 shows thatproportionately m

of the loans of higher value came from them. Figures 2 and 3 show that there were w
variations in the implicitpostharvest interest charges for the dura-LS and LS-dura lo
TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF SOURCES OF LOANS BY VALUE OF LOANS
(In Percentages)
VALUE (LS)

1-199

SOURCE

(N=565)

(N

Merchant

Rich

=

100

24

400+

(N=

53

29

farmer

Total

221)

47

person

Other

200-399

30
16

99

120)

55

22
23

100

NOTE: N= number of loans.

Figure 2 gives the breakdown of prices used to value repayment of dura-LS loans by
showing the percentage ofloans from each type oflender according to the effective price

receivedpersack. The averageprice receivedpersack, upon cashrepaymentofthe 185.2
sacks of dura advanced on credit during the rainy season, was only LS 94.2, well below
the price of around LS 150 that prevailed when the loans were taken. Most of the lower
prices were charged by farmers (54 percent); merchants generally obtained higherprices
for the dura advanced. The apparently large number of merchants who advanced grain
and were repaid less than the value ofthe grain at the time ofthe loan might be explained

by the fact that the market price dropped to LS 35 after the harvest, at the time of
repayment. The farmers who borrowedmay have been in strong "negotiating" positions
when it came time to settle accounts, and merchants accepted prices that were higher than

the prevailing postharvest price.

A similar picture emerges from an analysis of the repayment of LS-dura loans, as
shown in figure 3. For the LS 34,691 borrowed in this form, the lenders received (or

could expect to receive, according to the borrowers) 902.25 sacks of dura. Thus, the
lenders paid an average of LS 38.4 per sack when "buying" grain in advance of the
harvest. This price was just a little above the postharvest market price of LS 35. Figure
3 shows that more than half (99 out of 182) of all LS-dura loans were reckoned at about

the market price (LS 35-40) while the rest were almost equally divided between higher
and lower prices. Loans from merchants were more often characterized by lower prices
(more sacks repaid), while "rich persons" were more often sources of loans repaid with

higher effective prices (fewer sacks repaid).

Bireka Village. From October 1989 to December 1990 1 lived in the small village of
Bireka, about 40 kilometers south of El Obeid, the regional capital of Kordofan. There
were four kinds of credit in Bireka. Petty traders borrowed merchandise on credit from
their suppliers in El Obeid. There were no fonnal terms ofrepayment, though borrowers
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Fig. 2. Percentage of Dura-LS Loans from Each Type of Lender according to the Effective Price Received per

indicated that the relationship with the supplier would suffer if repayment were no

prompt. Virtually all borrowers stated that they would repay without interest. Trad

credit was not without risk; the borrower could find that market prices had sudden

fluctuated, and he might not be able to sell the stock for the purchase price. Or the g

might not be easily sold because of low demand, and the borrower might have to use

borrowed capital for consumption. The lender must then try to enforce repayment. L

in 1990, for instance, a used-clothing merchant from El Obeid spent two days travel

to the regional markets in search of several individuals who had borrowed clothing o
credit, with a value of LS 1,000-2,000.

Returned migrants were a second source of loans. The head of the wealthiest
household in Bireka, with two sons returned from Saudi Arabia, had given a loan of LS
1,000 to the village butcher. He claimed not to want interest; hejust wanted to be "assured

ofa steady supply ofmeat." The butcher gave the household a kilo ofmeat every Monday
and Friday, the equivalent of LS 200 per month. The butcher in turn provided no-interest
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Merchants m Rich persons Farmers
100

(N = 43) (N = 99) (N = 40)
Effective Prices Paid per Sack
Fig. 3. Percentage of LS-Dura Loans from Each Type of Lender according to the Effective Pnice Paid per Sack.

"store credit," along with his nephew, who owned a small shop at the truck stop along
the road to El Obeid, to the women who operated the tea stands along the road. The

women borrowed meat, sugar, tea, coffee, and oil in the mornings, and repaid in the
evening or the next day. Many of these noninterest short-term loans, though, were
outstanding for weeks.

Family members were another source of no-interest loans. Three Hausa men, for
instance, borrowed money from relatives from other villages. Two of these loans were
used to meet the costs of weddings. Relatives were also important sources of credit after
it became clear that the 1990 rainy season would fail and there would be no harvest.24

One man wrote to his brother who had migrated to Khartoum over 20 years before to
work as a police officer. Within two months the brother had sent LS 1,000 and a promise
of more help. The ability or willingness to borrow from wealthier relatives should not

be overestimated, however. One poor Hausa farmer stated that he had five relatives on

his father's side, all of whom were prosperous merchants. "Shaba 'aniin," he said about
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them, "full and satisfied." They lived in a village only an hour walk away, yet he had not
received any help from them, nor would he consider asking them for help. As his trading

capital invested in a small stock of secondhand clothing dwindled, he earned lower
profits and he and his family reduced their consumption.
The only lender of explicit interest-earning credit was the lender of six sheil loans to

Bireka villagers in the 1989 rainy season. He was from a neighboring village. He did not
hesitate to show me his notebook with the names ofthe borrowers along with the number

of groundnut sacks they had agreed to repay. The lender had advanced them LS 60 per
sack, and most had borrowed only one or two sacks worth of cash. At the time, LS 120
was roughly enough to purchase one month's grain for an average family. Six of the
borrowers were poor villagers who worked as daily laborers. The seventh sometimes
hired labor, and in a separate interview denied ever having borrowed. All of the
borrowers were heavy drinkers of merissa, the brewed sorghum beer, as was the trader.

They spent considerable time in each other's company during the long all-morning
drinking sessions that would be held every few days.
The trader stated that he had agreed to lend the money because all of the borrowers
had received groundnut seed from the Extension Department of the Regional Ministry
of Agriculture and had planted relatively large areas to groundnuts. It was the first time

he had ever lent money. The six Bireka borrowers repaid, but a seventh borrower, from

the trader's own village, had not. The trader said he had no intention of pursuing the
matter: "If I try, he will raise a fuss, and cause a lot of trouble, and complain about me."

The lender did not lend again in the 1990 season, though this may have beenbecause the
rains were poor.

Considering these various sources of loans, table 4 shows that only 17 out of 54
Bireka households borrowed during the 1989 and 1990 seasons; 10 of these loans were
without interest, 2 trade loans were interest bearing, and the 6 sheil loans were at variable
rates-the price of a sack of groundnuts turned out to be LS 1 10, which for a three month

loan would be roughly 30 percent per month in interest.

TABLE 4
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS BORROWING iN BIREKA VILLAGE BY SOURCE

No

Trade

Returned

Borrowing Sheil Credit Migrant Family
Hausa

20

2

3

7

5

0

0

0

12

1

2

0

1

Burgo
Arab

Total

39

0

6

3

5

2

4

There
was
also
o
1989
nor
was
it
cooperative
to
di
were
disbursed,
repayment
andto
was
average.
The
including
threate
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course of the year all of the borrowers from Bireka repaid, some very late. The resu

however, was that the cooperative could not get enough members to agree to borrow

third year for the 1989 season. Only 16 out of50 wanted to borrow again; the rest thou

it too risky. They did not want to lose their assets if the season failed. The ABS refus
to lend to the 16, saying it was too small a number to justify the costs of disbursing
collecting the loans.25

Four Villages near Jaibat. As noted earlier, the 1990 season tumed into a complete

crop failure over most of Kordofan. It was obvious very early in the season that
production would be severely affected; the price of grain went up to seven times the
previous postharvest price. Clearly the year ahead would be a time of subsistence living
for many. It was during this early period of uncertainty that we conducted a croppingsystems survey of four villages about three hours walk south from Bireka, clustered
around the market village and administrative center of Jaibat.26 The rains had been
slightly better, and some households expected to collect small harvests.

The survey respondents reported a fair amount of "musaada," or "help," extended
during this period of uncertainty. Out of 98 male-headed households in the sample, 36
had received cash or grain from kin, merchants, or persons from other villages. Out of
17 female-headed households, 2 had also borrowed. Together they had taken only 48
loans- 16 from kin, 32 from nonkin sources. Earlier in the season 4 households had also

borrowed from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan.
The amounts ofthe loans or help varied from LS 100 to LS 1,000 and from a few kilos
to several hundred kilo sacks of grain. (During this period the price of a sack of grain
varied from LS 1,200 to LS 1,800, and the official exchange rate had been devalued to

LS 12 = US $ 1.) The 3 8 households that borrowed received the equivalent ofLS 42,690,
or about LS 1,1 50 per household, when the grain loans were valued at prevailing market
prices. A majority of the loans were taken by households whose heads worked as day
laborers, but these tended to be smaller in size than the loans received by wealthier

farmers. Fifteen households stated that they had to borrow in order to purchase the
occasional government distributions of subsidized grain.
The important fact about these loans was that virtually all were extended in the form

of no-interest loans with no fixed period ofrepayment. In the sample of 1 5 households,
only 2 indicated that their loans were interest bearing or that they expected to repay more

then they had borrowed.
A Sample of Laborers Confronting Crop Failure. When the seriousness of the

drought became apparent, we conducted a survey of a quota sample of 60 household
heads who worked as day laborers in six villages in the area around Bireka.27 We asked
the laborers about four sources of actual or potential credit or assistance: migrants, kin
and neighbors, immediate family living outside the village, and nonkin. The answers

may be interpreted as giving an idea of the extent of emergency consumption credit or
transfers intended primarily for subsistence. Only 6 households stated that they could

rely on help or loans from returned migrants. There were 9 households that had

unmarried sons who lived away from the village and who regularly sent cash to their
families, usually on the order of LS 200-300 per month. Of 19 households that had
married children living away from the village, only 3 indicated receiving any assistance
from them. The most important source of assistance was explicit borrowing-24
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households borrowed amounts ranging from LS 100 to LS 3,500. The total borrowed
was LS 19,420, with the average loan being on the order ofLS 800, equivalent to perhaps
one month's consumption of grain.

Only three of the loans were interest-bearing: one from a merchant at 12 percent
interest per month, another from the village development fund (known as sandug kheiri)
that would be repaid at 15 percent per month if not repaid within a month, and the third

from amerchant who wantedhalfofthe profits derived from the loan for trading capital.
All of the other loans were at no interest.

One of the interesting patterns in the borrowing of the relatively homogeneous

laborers was the strong correlation between borrowing and wealth, measured in terms
of livestock (mostly goats and for the laborers of one village, cows). As can be seen in
table 5, where the laborers are broken down into four groups numbered 1 to 4, with the

higher-numbered groups having larger livestock holdings, those laborers with larger
livestock holdings both sold more livestock (because they had more to begin with) and
borrowed more. The exception was group four, which consisted of laborers from one
village whose residents specialized in cattle herding. These laborers owned two or three

cows each and had relatively low borrowing.
TABLE 5
BORROWING MATCHED WITH LIVESTOCK HOLDrNGS
AND SALES FOR SAMPLE OF 60 LABORERS
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New Approaches to the Study of Informal Credit in Sudan

This "revisionist" evidence and the ambiguities of previous research suggest that
informal credit in Sudan is more complex than the simple picture of exploitative
moneylending through sheil contracts. It is perhaps time to rethink what the objectives
are in empirical work on informal credit in Sudan, and to think about how the research

scope could be broadened so as to avoid focusing exclusively on interest rates. I would
like to suggest three fruitful avenues for future research.

Informality in Contract Form Rather Than Variation in Contract Forn. During the
1980s there was considerable interest in understanding the complexity, interlinkages,
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and variation in credit, land, and labor contracts. In particular, a large body of theory

arose explaining why variation in credit contracts, in both competitive and monopolistic
settings, is to be expected. Credit contracts may delimit maximum loan sizes, collateral
requirements,28 interlinkages with transactions in other markets, provisions regarding
enforcement, unforeseen contingencies, renegotiation,29 and monitoring, because loans
to different people are ofdifferent quality, and different kinds ofcontract attract different

kinds of loan applicants and have different incentive effects. These varied contract forms
may be both screening mechanisms and enforcement mechanisms, to use the terminology of Stiglitz and Hoff.30 The lender may avoid the "adverse selection" of ending up

with a mix ofborrowers weighted toward bad risks by offering a variety of contracts that

induce the borrowers to "self-select." By carefully constructing contracts, lenders might
be able to mitigate the losses resulting from lending to bad risks.
Differences in borrowers may also be the basis for profitable price discrimination

through variation in contract form. Borrowers are usually more risk averse than lenders
and are often willing to pay a premium to avoid risk. In sheil loans that specify the number

of sacks to be repaid, if prices turn out to be very low the borrower does not have to
increase the number of sacks to be repaid. Under some circumstances, then, the sheil
contract may be preferred to an interest rate contract; just as the Islamic profit-sharing
loan may be preferable to a fixed-interest loan. Certain kinds of borrowers will prefer
certain kinds of contracts.

These theoretical results explaining variation in contract form are compelling, and the
clean predictions about contract choice derived from the theory constitute an attractive
research agenda. Nevertheless, research on these lines is inappropriate for many parts
of Sudan. The striking feature about loans in eastern Gezira and western Sudan is the

informality of the contract. There is usually no explicit statement of contract length,
terms of repayment, or any of the other provisions previously mentioned. What this
suggests is that there is nothing definite about contract form; no contract form has
become institutionalized. The absence of an institution indicates a state of flux, and that
flux is the proper object of study.31
Let me illustrate this state of flux with an example from Bireka. A fairly well-off

farmer and trader, Salih Adam, had borrowed from a merchant in the nearby market
town. He had wanted money to finance the purchase of donkey saddles and bridles, his
stock in trade. The agreement with the merchant was for Salih to pay a monthly interest

rate of 15 percent. During the time I was in Bireka, however, Salih started studying to

be afaqih, a Koranic teacher and charm maker. In conversations with the imam of the
neighboring village, the subject of interest was raised. Salih decided, and the merchant
apparently agreed, that the loan should be transformed into a profit-sharing arrangement.

The demand for donkey riding gear decreased, however, as the drought reduced
purchasing power. In several conversations with me, Salih insisted that he had not made
any profits in his trade and so had not paid any money to the lender. At the time of my

departure, Salih said he would not pay any of the loan back.
While the loan transaction, its transformation from an interest to a profit-sharing
arrangement, and subsequent nonrepayment are hardly representative of the variety of
informal arrangements that were evident in Bireka, it does illustrate the point I want to

make: there was nothing institutionalized about the transaction, and therefore it

constituted one part of the process of the creation of institutions. The loan would be
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discussed, argued over, perhaps disputed, and would thus become part of the public
realm of discourse, shaping other lenders' and borrowers' attitudes and choices. The
important thing to study, in my view, is the process by which contract forms are
crystallizing and becoming predominant.

Rationing in Credit Markets. One expects to find considerable agricultural credit in

an economy with pronounced seasonality in crop production. Small farmers who have
little accumulated wealth need to finance their consumption and occasional hired labor.

Credit should smooth incomes dependent on variable weather and volatile prices. This
indeed appears to be the case in eastern Gezira. It is somewhat surprising, then, to find
so little informal credit in the village of Bireka in western Sudan.
There are three possible explanations for this fact of limited borrowing. The first is
that borrowing may be restricted because of imperfect information problems similar to
those discussed earlier. If there were excess demand for loans, the terms of loans would
not change, because with changes in terms the quality of borrowers might change, or the
incentives for borrowers to repay might change.32 Then the return to the lender might be

lower than before the change in repayment terms. Thus many borrowers would not be
able to borrow as much as they wanted at the interest rates offered in the market, and

many potential borrowers might be completely rationed.
The second explanation is that the opportunity cost of risking funds in the local loan

market is high because higher-level credit markets are characterized by high interest
rates and rationing. Suppliers of credit may be rationed. Any empirical analysis must
then address the national credit market and how financial capital is channeled to and from

rural areas.

The third explanation is simply that demand is very low; farmers do not choose to
borrow given existing terms.

How might these three possible explanations be distinguished? One way would be
to look at how the participants themselves explained the low level of borrowing.
Rhetoric about distrust, for instance, did serve as the most common explanation for the

absence of loans. Potential lenders were believed not to trust anyone who would come
to ask for a loan; requesting a loan is tantamount to an admission of inability or
unwillingness to repay. The rhetoric is somewhat surprising in a village of neighbors
who have known and transacted with each other over long periods of time. Surely not
every farmer was to be distrusted? Local discourse also had it that merchants and rich

people had no money to lend. Even a casual observer, however, would have difficulty
defending this as a primary explanation ofthe low volume of credit. For instance, many

poor families in the village of Um Showa, near Bireka, maintained that there was no
money available for lending. Yet there were 16 current or returned migrants to Iraq,
Libya, and the Gulf States in the 28 wealthier households ofthe village. The remittances
and earnings of these migrants overwhelmed any potential income earned by the other
villagers and could easily have been lent out. Finally, many people explained that there
was no lending because in fact no one needed to borrow; the people of the area were
relatively well-off, these informants said, and could rely on their own capital or work as
wage laborers if they needed cash. Village rhetoric, then, encompassed all three
explanations.
A more satisfying approach would be to estimate a structural model of the informal
credit market, deriving the parameters of the supply and demand function. Ideally one
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would want to distinguish the different influences on supply and demand-opportuni
costs, costs of potential defaults as expressed in distrust, and demand.
Several recent papers have estimated structural models of this sort (concentraing

the interaction between formal and informal markets), and their methods should be u

in future research on Sudanese credit markets. Bell, Snivasan, and Udry estimate

degree of rationing in Punjab agriculturl credit markets; they find that most borrow

are rationed in both the regulated cooperative sector and in the unregulated priv
sector.33 Kochar estimates the rationing of borrowers in Uttar Pradesh in India a

reaches an opposite conclusion, arguing that low demand is responsible for the la
number of sample respondents who did not borrow from the formal sector.34

Political Patronage and Credit. Richards has drawn attention to the politics of
patronage and indebtedness in Sierra Leone, and a similar approach to infornal credit

in Sudan might yield considerable insight.35 One of the fundamental problems in
analyzing credit trasactions in Sudan is the large number ofno-interest loans. How are
these to be accounted for? One likely possibility is thatpolitical power is being purchased
through extending credit. The village of Bireka, for instance, was mired in conflicts

along ethnic and class lines. Three ethnic groups lived in the village. Hausa migrants
from Nigeria constituted the majority, mixed Arab and indigenous groups (of Nuba
origins) held overt political power, and a small group of Burgo households, originally
from the Chad border area, maintained a vocal opposition. These groups also divided

along class lines, and alliances shifted according to situations. One clear influence in
political alignments, however, was the disproportionate wealth (compared with other
villagers) of one Arab household head whose sons had migrated to Saudi Arabia. Many
poor villagers would cite his wealth, and his potential to refuse assistance in times of
need, as a factor in their decisions about political alignment on the periodic questions that

would divide the villagers. Village politics were muted during 1990, the period when I
was doing fieldwork, because of the uncertainty over ideology and practice emanating
from Khartoum. It was certain, however, that the wealthy Arab household would use its
economic influence to extend its political influence to an even greater degree when the
political environment became more settled.

Concluding Comments
In this paper I have suggested, to return to my initial metaphor, that the sheil is a shill,

in the sense that many academic writers have drawn large and sometimes inappropriate
generalizations from an unclear and selective body of evidence in order to characterize

rural Sudanese economic relations. The evidence presented here indicates that rural
credit markets are far more complex and varied than the shills would have one believe.
This observation is important for policy, suggesting that the urgency with which rural

credit is advocated (because small farmers are being "ruthessly exploited') leads to
hurried, expensive, overextended, and ultimately ill-conceived credit programs that
amount to little more than one-time subsidies to selectgroups offarmers-those who are
most able to take advantage of the subsidies as a result of wealth or political connections.36 The implication of this paper's criticism ofthe conventional wisdom about sheil
is that credit programs should be small-scale and locally designed, and should emphasize
local participation in determining the institutional features of formal lending. Such an
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approach is labor intensive, to be sure, but unless steps are taken in that direction,
development banks and donor agencies are sure to continue to "undermine rural
development with cheap credit."37
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